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1 Introduction
Discrimination in organizations is a prominent topic for regulators as well as
researchers. Previous research studies about discrimination focused on employees
(Bielby and Baron 1986; Goldman et al. 2006), managers (Piderit and Ashford
2003; King et al. 2010), and board members (Hillman et al. 2002; Bilimoria and
Piderit 1994). In addition to the direct discrimination that occurs when companies
do not appoint adequate numbers of minorities (Singh and Vinnicombe 2004), the
indirect discrimination via compensation differences is a frequently discussed
phenomenon (Millsap and Taylor 1996). With respect to gender, research
discovered a pay gap in the general work force (Blau and Kahn 2001, 2007) as
well as among executives (Kulich et al. 2011; Renner et al. 2002; Bertrand and
Hallock 2001). In most cases, researchers identified human capital attributes such as
a generally lower level of education of females as well as women’s lower work
experience as reason for the gender pay gap (Blau and Kahn 2007).
Drawing on the language theory of discrimination (Lang 1986), our research
provides further insights to explain the residual gap between the compensation
levels of female and male executives that are not explained by human capital
attributes. Existing studies with focus on the link between individual attributes and
compensation missed to consider characteristics and preferences of the committee
that is ultimately deciding on executive compensation packages—the board of
directors. Based on the concept of differences in methods of speaking and listening
of the language theory of discrimination (Lang 1986), transaction costs emerge from
communication between a majority and a minority. Boards have two options to react
to these proposed transaction costs that a company might incur due to a minority
member among members of the majority—in our analysis a female among male
executives. First, they might refrain from appointing female managers entirely. The
elevated political and social pressure, however, detains companies from this form of
direct discrimination in their hiring strategy. Board members might, therefore,
decide in favor of the second possible reaction and pass along the proposed
transaction costs to the female manager and consequently grant them a lower
compensation, regardless of the woman’s human capital. Thus, we control for
aspects of human capital when examining the pay gap between female and male
managers and ask in our research question whether the assessment of transaction
costs that leads to this pay gap is influenced by network embeddedness of board
members. We adopt two competing theoretical perspectives to examine embedd-
edness effects on discrimination: the possibility of homophily among economic
elites (Shipilov et al. 2011; McPherson et al. 2001) and the resource function of
board networks (Beckman and Haunschild 2002; Shropshire 2010; Hillman et al.
2007). On the one hand, board members become members of the economic elite via
additional directorships (Useem 1982; Davis and Greve 1997; Westphal and Khanna
2003) and this societal class is still predominately male (Adams and Ferreira 2009;
Huse et al. 2009; Hillman et al. 2007). Following the homophily among economic
elites perception of board embeddedness, embedded boards assess transaction costs
for communication and cooperation with the female minority as greater. Since they
pass on these greater transaction costs to female managers, the gender pay gap
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increases. On the other hand, the network of additional directorships might serve a
resource function (Haunschild and Beckman 1998; Shropshire 2010). Through
learning opportunities on different boards and exposure to more diverse groups, the
estimation of language barriers and accordingly the assessment of transaction costs
is reduced. This leads to less discrimination and a diminished gender pay gap among
managers in turn.
Based on a data set of all the German Prime standard listed companies, we
constructed a matched sample based on company and individual characteristics
leading to a final matched sample of 112 female and male executive year
observations. Our results show that there is a gender pay gap between female and
male executives even after controlling for human capital attributes. Furthermore,
with increasing embeddedness of the board of directors, the gap between female and
male compensation levels decreases. This suggests that the positive aspects of board
networks, i.e., the resource function, outweigh the negative facets, i.e., homophily
among economic elites.
The results of our analyses contribute to research in three ways: First, in the
research on unequal pay for female and male executives, this is the first time that the
perspective of the deciders is examined more thoroughly. We show that deciders’
impact should not be neglected and the gender pay gap is not only a result of
managers’ ability and character but also of the deciders’ role and experience.
Second, we extend the transaction costs-based language theory of discrimination by
aspects of network embeddedness. Our results allow the presumption that directors
gain knowledge via their embeddedness which changes their assessment of
transaction costs that originate from communication and cooperation between a
majority and a minority. Therefore, network embeddedness can influence the level
of discrimination in the corporate world. Third, we provide further insights into the
resource functions of the board of directors (Hillman et al. 2000, 2009). We offer
empirical indication that the network directors are embedded which might serve as
learning platform also when assessing language barriers between the majority and
minorities.
2 Literature overview, theoretical background and hypotheses
Our study brings together two streams of research: board embeddedness research
and research about determinants of executive pay, specifically the gender pay gap
between female and male executives. The role of director embeddedness in
corporate governance decisions already found broad attention in academia, as the
following examples indicate. Researchers could for instance find evidence for the
relevance of director embeddedness as an information channel in merger decisions
(Haunschild and Beckman 1998). Additionally, it was shown that director
embeddedness increases the embeddedness of firms and, thus increases the
likelihood that firms go into joint ventures (Gulati and Westphal 1999). However,
researchers could also find that director embeddedness leads to the formation of an
economic elite (Allen 1974) that might not act in the interest of the firm anymore
but rather optimizes its own interests. Through their embeddedness, directors learn
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to overcome their inhibitions for criminal behavior such as the backdating of options
in executive compensation schemes (Bizjak et al. 2009). Generally, the effect of
director embeddedness on firm level outcomes is still unclear. We thus want to shed
more light into the question of the efficacy of embeddedness by the investigation of
its role in situations of gender pay gap.
Research about determinants of executive pay is similarly multifaceted.
Researcher showed that the level of executive compensation mainly depends on
company properties as well as on personal characteristics of the manager. Firm size
(Fahlenbrach 2009; Renner et al. 2002) firm performance (Antle and Smith 1986;
Bebchuk and Fried 2006; Devers et al. 2007), and a firm’s ownership structure
(Thomsen and Pedersen 2000; Chowdhury and Wang 2009) are company properties
that researchers identified as drivers of executive compensation levels. Managers’
tenure (Hill and Phan 1991) and gender (Kulich et al. 2011; Renner et al. 2002), on
the other hand, are personal characteristics that influence managers’ compensation
levels directly or as moderating effects, e.g., through affecting labor market mobility
and search firms’ preferences (Dreher et al. 2011). Additionally, psychological
factors such as the tendency to social comparison between directors and managers
influence the level of pay (O’Reilly et al. 1988). Westphal and Zajac (1995) also
factor board members into decisions on compensation levels. They propose that
social similarity between the board of directors and the CEO leads to higher CEO
compensation. Fiss (2006) showed a similar effect for the similarity between CEO
and chairman of the board. We thus acknowledge the relevance of board members
in compensation decisions since the board of directors that appoints managers is
also responsible for their compensation contracts and focuses on their impact on the
gender pay gap (§87 of the German Aktiengesetz determines that the board of
directors is responsible for the executives’ compensation level and structure).
With respect to the issue of unequal pay for women and men, the following
studies exist. Researchers identified characteristics on company as well as individual
levels that drive those compensation differences (Arulampalam et al. 2007; Solberg
and Laughlin 1995; Blau and Kahn 1999; Rubery 1995). The gender pay gap is very
often attributed to human capital differences between women and men: Work
experience due to parental leave (Blau and Kahn 2007), education received (Blau
and Kahn 2001), differences in occupations (Daymont and Andrisani 1984),
differences about choices concerning career, job, and family (Tharenou 2008) as
well as negotiation skills (Greig 2008; Kaman and Hartel 1994), non-cognitive skills
such as assertiveness and confidence (Grove et al. 2011), lower preferences for
performing in a competition and lower overconfidence (Niederle and Vesterlund
2007), and expectations of what can be earned (Major and Konar 1984) are factors
identified to drive the gender pay gap. Consequently, managers with a higher skill
level (including better negotiation skills) should receive a higher compensation.
Therefore, researchers attributed the difference in compensation to the managers’
characteristics—especially their human capital. Latest studies found indications that
this gender pay gap also exists beyond these human capital explanations (Kulich
et al. 2011).
Thus, in summary, we identified two gaps in research that our study intends to
close: First, we want to close the gap of the missing focus on executive pay,
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specifically the gender pay gap, in director embeddedness research. Second, we
follow the trend of considering boards’ influence in compensation decisions and
close the gap of the missing focus on boards influence, specifically board
embeddedness in gender pay gap literature.
2.1 Theory of discrimination and gender pay gap
We draw the theory of discrimination to create theoretical basis to explain a gender
pay gap beyond human capital explanations and to create a basis for our
investigations of the effect of embeddedness on the gender pay gap. The concept of
discriminatory behavior by (Becker 1957) bases discrimination on role prejudice
and explains discrimination via differences in expected task ability. The original
work of Becker applies to racial minorities. Blau and Kahn (2007) use Becker’s
theory to explain part of the gender pay gap. However, Becker’s theory became
controversial as the uniqueness of good management roles became questionable
since different configurations of management characteristics make successful
managers. An alternative theoretical approach to comprehend the source of
discriminatory behavior goes back to Lang (1986). He sees gender-specific
differences in ‘methods of speaking and listening’ (1986: 364) as reason for
discriminatory behavior. On a management team, communication is a requisite for
successful cooperation. Female executives as a minority have to primarily
communicate with male colleagues. From the board’s standpoint, there is the threat
of worsened group efficiency of the executives caused by different methods of
communication. Optimal collaboration in the top management team requires that
colleagues use a similar language. Otherwise, collaboration of the majority with
minorities results in the emergence of transaction costs driven by different methods
of communication. To prevent these group efficiency problems, generally, two
options for directors exist. They could either stop appointing minorities to
management positions or pass on the transaction costs to the minority by adjusting
their compensation downward. In times of quota as well as social and media
pressure against direct discrimination on a corporate level (Hoel 2008; Bøhren and
Strøm 2010), the most obvious option for board members to price in the expected
transaction costs of appointing a minority is to reduce the allowed compensation
paid to that minority.
2.2 Network embeddedness effects on discrimination
The level to which board members will assess these transaction costs depends on
their evaluation of the size of the language barrier. Board members’ network
embeddedness can have different effects on this assessment. Network embedded-
ness refers to the extent to which board members are connected to their peers via
multiple directorships, thereby connecting the focal company to others (Gel-
etkanycz and Boyd 2011; Boyd 1990). It affects board members’ cognition of the
corporate context and corporate relations (Shropshire 2010). The direction of the
expected embeddedness effect on the hypothesized gender pay gap is ambiguous,
however. We identify two competing theories that will result in two opposing
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hypotheses: homophily among members of the economic elite versus resource
provision and learning function of embedded boards.
Networks lead to the formation of elites (Davis and Greve 1997; Useem 1982).
With respect to gender, these elites are predominately male (Daily et al. 1999;
Bilimoria and Piderit 1994, Brammer et al. 2009; Adams and Ferreira 2009; Huse
et al. 2009; Hillman et al. 2007). Among groups with similar demographical
attributes, homophilous behavior can be observed (McPherson and Smith-Lovin
1987). The argument of homophilous behavior is derived from the concept of social
similarity (McPherson et al. 2001; Wellman 1926)—meaning that individuals are
acting in favor of other individuals that are similar to themselves (Pearce and Xu
2012). The underlying argument is the individuals’ expectation of the similarity of
values, interests and norms of individuals with similar demographical characteristics
(Ibarra 1992; McPherson et al. 2001). As early as 1950, homophily was observable
among American CEOs, who were mainly white, Protestant and born to non-
immigrant, urban families (Mills 1956). The individual visualizes that similar
demographic attributes mean sharing similar agendas (Dutton et al. 2002). On board
level, Westphal and Stern (2007) showed that, compared to the majority, dissimilar
directors were not rewarded as much for expected behavior as well as punished
more for socially not appreciated behavior.
Applying the argumentation of homophily and social similarity on Lang’s (1986)
transaction costs interpretation of discrimination, the affiliation with a network
affects the assessment of the transaction costs. To work effectively, managers have
to communicate with their colleagues. The existence of communication barriers
might cause the emergence of transaction costs. Communication barriers are higher
between a majority and a minority than within a socially similar group. When
appointing a new manager, the board of directors has to evaluate the fit of the
candidates to the existing management team and assess the resulting transaction
costs. The board members’ psychological cognition influences this assessment.
Board members who behave more homophilously due to their elite network
affiliation assess communication barriers between a minority and the majority and
the resulting transaction costs higher. This assessment leads to a decision in favor of
the majority as well as a higher discount in compensation levels for minority
managers, respectively. The assessment of communication barriers and transaction
costs between minorities and the majority, therefore, increases with the directors’
embeddedness into an elite network, and consequently leads to an increase of the
gender pay gap.
H1: Director embeddedness increases the gender pay gap.
An alternative way to see the network is in a positive light of a learning platform
and information channel (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Carpenter and Westphal 2001;
Lynall et al. 2003; Harris and Shimizu 2004; Shropshire 2010). A higher assessment
of language barriers with minority managers could be a product of stereotypes and
lack of experience. In the absence of precise information, stereotypes are more
probable to affect individuals’ cognition (Bielby and Baron 1986) and substitute de
facto knowledge channels (Plaks and Tory Higgins 2000). By serving on different
boards, a director experiences different company cultures and different individuals
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who may not belong to the majority group the director feels associated with. Via
their networks, board members can gain experience about communication skills of
other board members and managers, especially those the directors are unfamiliar
with due to social dissimilarity. A multitude of board seats, furthermore, gives the
directors the opportunity to experience the benefits of diversity first hand. Network
embeddedness and its utilization as a learning platform then lead to a reduction of
preconceptions and discrimination of female managers. Thus, the actual knowledge
gained through network embeddedness reduces the reliance on stereotypes, reduces
the assessment of communication barriers and transaction costs between the
majority and a minority, and in turn decreases the gender pay gap among managers.
H2: Director embeddedness reduces the gender pay gap.
3 Sample and data
In the following part, we describe the properties of our sample and the method of
deriving it.
3.1 Sample definition
The German law VorstOG of 2005 (law passed in 2005 that made it mandatory for
companies to disclose the individual compensation of their managers unless the
annual shareholders’ assembly vetoes this) has made it mandatory for German-listed
companies to disclose the compensation of their managers. We base our research on
the companies listed in the German Prime Standard (market segment with the
highest disclosure and reporting standards for German listed companies) during the
years 2005 until 2009 and rely on a matched sample for our analyses (Arthaud-Day
et al. 2006; Cannella et al. 1995; Kulich et al. 2011). We exclude financial
companies from the sample—identified by an SIC code between 6,000 and 6,799
(Farrell et al. 2008)—because their firm characteristics such as leverage and total
assets (important control variables for our matching and regressions) differ from
those of non-financial companies and would thus lead to estimation biases. The final
database consists of an unbalanced panel of 1,458 firm years. This sample covers
4,731 executive year positions.
We constructed our matched sample in two steps due to the relatively small
number of female executives in German companies and to incorporate both
company properties and personal characteristics that might affect the level of
compensation (e.g., Renner et al. 2002; Kulich et al. 2011). We first identified
female executives on the basis of annual reports, the Hoppenstedt Aktienfu¨hrer
(German periodical similar to Moody’s manuals), Lexis-Nexis and inquiries to
investor relation departments. For every identified woman, we hand collected the
following data for the respective year she served as an executive: her functional
responsibilities, her age and tenure as well as the compensation received. Next, we
used Propensity Score Matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) at the company level
to match five nearest neighbor companies without a female executive to every
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company with a female executive for the respective year (Leuven and Sianesi 2003;
Santalo´ and Kock 2009). The purpose of this procedure is to find comparable male
managers for the female managers of our sample. Thus, in a first step, we try to find
comparable companies to the companies with female managers. For this reason, we
use the STATA command psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi 2003) which provides us
the five most comparable companies to the company with the female manager based
on predefined input variables (in our case company size and performance). The
variables for this matching were company size and performance—two properties
identified as main drivers of compensation in earlier studies (Rapp and Wolff 2010;
Fahlenbrach 2009). Bertrand and Hallock (2001) identified company size as a
reason for unequal compensation between female and male managers since on
average female top managers appeared to work for smaller companies than male
peers which in turn negatively impacts their compensation levels. Renner et al.
(2002) see company size as a proxy for responsibility an executive has. The
increased responsibilities in larger companies, therefore, require higher
compensations.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the used variables
Panel A: descriptive statistics Panel
B:
VIF
Mean SD Min Max Obs Max.
VIF
COMPENSATION 6.168 0.952 2.565 7.929 122 –
WOMAN 0.500 0.502 0.000 1.000 122 5.39
TENURE 3.139 1.482 0.000 5.258 122 2.19
AGE 6.333 0.134 6.010 6.750 122 2.30
COMPANY_AGE 2.048 1.038 0.000 4.090 122 4.91
EMPLOYEES 7.452 2.317 3.401 12.912 122 5.31
LEVERAGE 0.201 0.183 0.000 0.732 120 2.28
ROE 5.168 23.169 -74.470 38.056 122 2.14
TOBIN’S Q 1.716 0.849 0.622 5.178 120 2.06
RISK 0.218 1.709 -4.990 7.750 120 1.74
#EXECUTIVES 3.869 1.590 1.000 8.000 122 4.22
#COMMITIEES 1.951 1.781 0.000 7.000 122 4.60
PERCENTAGE_EXECUTIVES 0.178 0.196 0.000 0.750 120 2.37
BOARD_TENURE 4.237 2.626 0.000 11.750 122 3.39
EXTERNAL_BLOCKHOLDER 0.492 0.502 0.000 1.000 122 2.77
OWNER_CONTROLLED_MANAGING_BOARD 0.254 0.437 0.000 1.000 122 3.05
FEMALE_DIRECTOR 0.492 0.502 0.000 1.000 122 3.40
AVG_NUMBER_OF_INTERLOCKS 1.621 1.135 0.000 4.500 118 4.43
EIGENVECTOR_CENTRALITY 0.008 0.023 0.000 0.148 118 2.31
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in the matched sample
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After this automated matching at the company level, we matched the most
similar male executive of the five nearest neighbor companies to every female
executive based on their respective functional responsibilities. An automated
matching was not possible in this step due to the different nomenclature for the
respective functional responsibilities across companies as well as the possibility of a
manager’s responsibility for multiple functions at the same time. Furthermore, some
companies are structured by division and others by function. In this step, we allow
that a female manager who is in our sample for more than 1 year can have different
male matches over the year. In this way, we can avoid matching biases in our results
due to changes in functional responsibilities of the female or the male manager from
1 year to the other. We then collected the same data for the male control group as
for the female executives in the first step.
The strength of the resulting sample is the 1:1-matching of personal and firm
years. Conditions for being included in the regressions are the following: First, for
some individuals, data on compensation received were not available. This
possibility exists because of an opt-out rule specified in the VorstOG which
enables shareholders to veto the individual disclosure of the company’s executives’
compensation (§286 subparagraph 5). Second, the compensation packages had to be
comparable and, therefore, we only included executives with 12 months of tenure
per year. These adjustments yield a matched sample of overall 122 executive/firm
years (61 male and 61 female). 112 of them were included in the calculated models
due to the partial unavailability of control variables. To provide evidence for the
equivalency of the two sub-samples, we tested for the sub-samples’ equality with
regard to firm size, firm performance as well as ownership structure (Arthaud-Day
et al. 2006). The results indicated no differences of statistical significance between
the female and the male sub-samples.
Sources for personal characteristics were mainly companies’ annual reports as
well as the Hoppenstedt Aktienfu¨hrer. Company properties originated from two
sources: The Thomson Financial Worldscope database delivered information such
as number of employees and financial data (e.g., return on equity). Corporate
governance variables concerning the board and ownership structure of a company
originate from business reports as well as the Hoppenstedt Aktienfu¨hrer. Some of
the used data were also part of a project with the German Federal Ministry of
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (Lindsta¨dt et al. 2011). Table 1
gives an overview of the variables’ descriptive statistics and Table 2 shows their
pairwise correlations.
3.2 Variables
The dependent variable of our analysis is COMPENSATION which equals the
amount of compensation received by the focal executive in the respective year
denoted in thousand Euros. This amount is composed of the fixed salary, the
performance-based compensation (bonus and stock-based incentives) and fringe
benefits usually paid for company cars and telecommunication devices. We did not
include pension benefits and single payments due to the lack of a clear rule of
disclosure for these parts as well as the non-comparability across companies. We
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used the natural logarithm of the total amount to reduce heteroskedasticity (Boyd
1994; Brenner and Schwalbach 2003; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989) and to
control for skewness (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Fahlenbrach 2009). We made
the results robust against outliers by winsorizing the variable on the 1 % level
(Kuhnen and Niessen 2012).
The dummy variable WOMAN is the explaining variable that enables us to
analyze the gender pay gap. It is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the executive is
female and 0 otherwise.
The sets of control variables depict personal characteristics and company
properties. At the personal level, we include the variables AGE to account for the
age of the executive as well as TENURE to control for senior leadership experience
(Vieito and Khan 2012; Hill and Phan 1991). Both are measured in the natural
logarithm of the respective time spans measured in months (Masulis and Mobbs
2012; Alissa 2009; Vieito and Khan 2012).
At the company level, we control for financial, company and corporate
governance characteristics. As financial characteristics, we use LEVERAGE
(quotient of total debt to total assets) as a proxy for the company’s capital structure
(Shaw and Zhang 2010) as well as the variable RISK (standard deviation of the
operating performance over the focal and the 2 preceding years divided by their
mean—winsorized to guard from outliers) to depict firm risk. We incorporate an
accounting-based as well as a stock-based measure for firm performance (Kulich
et al. 2011; Adams and Ferreira 2009), i.e., the company’s ROE and TOBIN’S Q,
respectively, to control for their effects on executive compensation (Antle and
Smith 1986; Bebchuk and Fried 2006; Devers et al. 2007).
Company characteristics include the variable EMPLOYEES as a proxy for
company size (Renner et al. 2002; Fahlenbrach 2009) measured as the natural
logarithm of the total number of employees (Zona et al. 2013); and COM-
PANY_AGE (Musteen et al. 2010) measured as the natural logarithm of the number
of years since the company’s IPO.
The corporate governance characteristics include the variable #EXECUTIVES
which represents the number of executives including the focal manager. The
ownership structure (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000; Chowdhury and Wang 2009) is
represented by the two dummy variables EXTERNAL_BLOCKHOLDER and
OWNER_CONTROLLED_MANAGING_BOARD. We also control for the fol-
lowing board characteristics expecting a lower compensation with more efficient
boards: #COMMITTEES measures the number of committees composed by the
board and might decrease control efficiency of the board since decisions can be
made in small groups and do not necessarily have to be defended in front of all
board members. BOARD_TENURE is the mean value of all directors’ tenures on
the focal board and might affect executive compensation since on the one hand
tenure reduces board independence but on the other hand it increases firm level
experience of directors which enables them to a stricter argumentation in bargaining
situations. PERCENTAGE_EXECUTIVES refers to the percentage of directors
who are currently executives in another company which, e.g., provides them better
access to benchmark information about acceptable compensation levels. Specific to
our research question, we also control for the gender composition of the board
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(Duchon et al. 1986) by including FEMALE_DIRECTOR, a dummy variable
equaling 1 if at least one female director is a member of the board.
We use two proxies to capture the aggregate embeddedness of the boards:
Researchers have shown that interlocks have an impact on learning and the spread
of practices through a network (Davis 1991). AVG_NUMBER_OF_INTERLOCKS
measures the average number of additional board seats the directors of the focal
board hold. It depicts the opportunity of the directors to gain knowledge and
experience first-hand. Additionally, we incorporate a measure of centrality into our
model (Renneboog and Zhao 2011; Ahuja et al. 2009; Shipilov et al. 2010).
EIGENVECTOR_CENTRALITY is the average eigenvector centrality of all
members of the focal board. The idea behind this variable is to distinguish between
more and less important interlocks. The relative importance is determined by the
centrality of the directors the focal director is connected with (Bonacich 1972,
1987). Values are calculated by solving the following linear equation:
CEði; tÞ ¼ 1k
P
j;i6¼j aij  CEðj; tÞ, with CE equaling the eigenvector centrality, aij
equaling the entries of the adjacency matrix A and meaning that i contributes to j’s
status and k equaling the largest eigenvalue (Bonacich and Lloyd 2001). This means
that director i is more central, the more central his contacts j are. The equation is
solved by an iterative algorithm. It is a measure that captures how much the
directors are part of the nationwide elite network. Centrality within a network is
often related not only to a fast spread of knowledge and experience (Shipilov and Li
2008; Shipilov et al. 2010) but also to homophilous behavior. By incorporating both
of these measures, we are able to capture both the resource and learning function
and the economic elite concept of the network embeddedness.
Table 5 in the Appendix gives an overview of the variables and their respective
definitions.
4 Empirical results
At first, we explain the empirical design before we show the results and their
robustness.
4.1 Empirical design
As stated in the first hypothesis, we expect a gender pay gap even after controlling
for various other effects on the personal and company levels. Therefore, we specify
our main model as:
COMPENSATION ¼ f Gender; Personal Characteristics; Company Propertiesð Þ:
ð1Þ
In accordance with the further research design of the second step, we test this
main model into two versions, one with AVG_NUMBER_OF_INTERLOCKS and
one with EIGENVECTOR_CENTRALITY as control variable depicting the
directors’ network embeddedness. To test hypotheses 1 and 2, we then include
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the interaction terms WOMAN * AVG_NUMBER_OF_INTERLOCKS and
WOMAN * EIGENVECTOR_CENTRALITY, respectively, in the regression to
determine whether a more embedded board increases or decreases the gender pay
gap.
In all cases, we use a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to test the
hypotheses. The OLS method is the obvious choice of method because our pairs of
female and male executives do not stay the same across years which makes panel
data methods unemployable. We include year and industry effects defined by the
Fama/French-12 industry logic (Fama and French 1997). To guard our regression
against heteroscedasticity, we use Huber/White standard errors (White 1980;
Petersen 2009). Further, we report the maximum variance inflation factor (VIFs) for
each variable (see Table 1): Values equal or beneath 5.39 indicate that the problem
of multi-collinearity can be rejected (Shipilov et al. 2010; Harris and Shimizu
2004).
4.2 Regressions results
4.2.1 Gender pay gap
The models in Table 3 show strong support for the existence of a gender pay gap
although the managers are comparable with respect to their human capital. The
variable WOMAN is significant at the 5 % level (t = -2.39/-2.38) and the
coefficient is negative (b = -0.426/-0.426). This result indicates that even after
controlling for human capital variables as well as various other influences, a female
executive still receives a lower compensation than a comparable male. Thus, human
capital which researchers identified as main reason for the gender pay gap (Bowles
et al. 2007; Blau and Kahn 2007; Solberg and Laughlin 1995; Kaman and Hartel
1994) is not the only driver of compensation levels. With this result, we show that a
pay gap among German executives in fact exists. This result falls in line with studies
for other geographical regions (e.g., Renner et al. 2002).
4.2.2 Gender pay gap and directors’ embeddedness
Table 4 shows the results for the OLS regression with the additional incorporation
of the interaction effects WOMAN * AVG_NUMBER_OF_INTERLOCKS and
WOMAN * EIGENVECTOR_CENTRALITY, respectively. According to these
results, hypothesis H1 can be rejected and H2 can be supported. The model shows a
significant positive effect on the 5 % level of the interaction term (b = 0.217,
t = 2.08 and b = 16.192, t = 2.31). Figure 1 illustrates the interaction effects
based on state of the art plotting procedures (Aiken and West 1991; Tang et al.
2011). These results support the hypothesis that director embeddedness reduces
gender discrimination through unequal executive compensation and can be used as
further indication that embedded directors might use the multitude of board seats as
a learning platform (Shropshire 2010; Hillman et al. 2007; Haunschild and Beckman
1998). The experience that directors gain via their network embeddedness might
affect their assessment of language barriers and proposed transaction costs in a
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positive way and reduce the compensation discount that is passed on to female
managers. The positive influence of the learning platform, therefore, outweighs the
sentiment of homophily and elite status.
4.3 Robustness tests
To show the robustness of our results, we challenged them on two different levels.
First, we re-calculated our model with different proxies for some of the independent
variables yielding the same results qualitatively: instead of EMPLOYEES as a
proxy for company size, we used ASSETS as well as SALES, i.e., the natural


















High  centrality (1 s.d.) Low  centrality (1 s.d.)
Fig. 1 Moderating effects of number of interlocks and centrality on the relationship between gender and
compensation
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2011; Elston and Goldberg 2003; Shipilov et al. 2010). We also used another
definition of leverage using long-term total debt divided by total assets. Instead of
the dummies EXTERNAL_BLOCKHOLDER and OWNER_CONTROLLED_MA-
NAGING_ BOARD to depict the ownership structure, we used the percentages of
shares held by different groups of investors: MANAGEMENT_OWNERSHIP for
members of the management team, PRIVATE_OWNERSHIP for private owners
who are not part of the management team BANK_OWNERSHIP for banks, and
INDUSTRY_OWNERSHIP for other companies. Additionally, we changed the
control FEMAL_DIRECTOR from a dummy to a percentage variable and our
results remained stable. We also changed the accounting-based and stock-based
company performance measures and received the same results. Instead of the return
on equity, we used the OPERATIVE_PERFORMANCE (calculated as operative
income after depreciation divided by the mean of total assets of the focal and the
previous year) as well as the return on assets ROA, and instead of TOBINS’ Q we
also used DIVIDEND YIELD (dividends per share divided by market price at year
end). Furthermore, we challenged our results by substituting both performance
measures with the respective values of the previous year as well as with the average
of the focal and the previous year.
Second, we gave further robustness to our results by altering the dependent
variable. To preempt the suspicion that the pay gap might be driven by differences
in the performance-related compensation of females and males, we used the natural
logarithm of the executives’ fixed salary as dependent variable and received the
same results as with total compensation. This check exhibits that the results
regarding the indirect discrimination as well as the influence of directors’
embeddedness are not only driven by different performance-based compensation
components between female and male executives.
5 Discussion and conclusion
We started our research with the question whether a gender pay gap exists in
management compensation and whether this relation between managers’ gender and
their compensation was moderated by director embeddedness. Drawing on an
economics-based perception of discrimination, we model directors’ role in the
decision process on compensation contracts for female and male managers via
transaction costs. This transaction cost model of discrimination allows us to
integrate psychological aspects, i.e., homophily, and resource dependence theory-
based ideas of networks as learning platforms into the classical agency decision on
the level of manager compensation.
Our results are in detail that first, a pay gap between female and male managers is
observable even after controlling for aspects of human capital. Second, the network
that board members create with further board seats on other companies’ boards
reduces this pay gap. This is in line with existing studies which argue that the
network works as a learning platform (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Shropshire 2010;
Carpenter and Westphal 2001; Haunschild and Beckman 1998; Geletkanycz and
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Boyd 2011). The results indicate that the experience of other board positions might
provide directors with the information they need to overcome their presumption of
language barriers. In turn the occurring transaction costs are assessed lower, the
discount on female manager’s compensation levels is smaller and the gender pay
gap decreases.
Our research contributes to the existing literature on top management
compensation by taking the deciders’ perspective. For the first time, the deciders’
preferences were chosen to explain the gender pay gap. We show that this
dimension plays a viable role in compensation setting and, therefore, the
formation of unequal pay of female and male mangers. Our analyses integrate
language theory which uses transaction costs as an explanation of discrimination
and the theory of network embeddedness. The combination of these two theories
enables us to explain further parts of the gender pay gap that have not been
accounted for so far and at the same time identify a lever to reduce it. Network
embeddedness can provide directors knowledge they can use to better assess
transaction costs incurred by the company due to communication and cooperation
between a minority and a majority group. Thus, our results offer an indication
how embeddedness of directors might impact the discrimination that occurs in the
corporate world. We also provide further insights into the resource functions of
the board of directors (Hillman et al. 2000, 2009). We propose that director
networks serve as positive learning platforms instead of negative elite networks
where members only try to further their power and influence. Via their network
embeddedness, directors gain more experience with minority groups which
reduces their presumption of language barrier and leads to a more accurate
assessment of the skills and character of a minority manager.
Additionally, we identify a gender pay gap on the level of executives in
Germany. This is the first in-depth analysis of this group and the results confirm
similar findings for other institutional environments, such as the US (Renner et al.
2002) and the UK (Kulich et al. 2011).
Although we are able to control for many effects, our research is not without
limitations. Some information that might also impact the gender pay gap is not
disclosed in a way that makes collecting it possible without a bias (e.g., number
of children, time of parental leave, time worked part-time, and percentages of
women in the companies’ workforce). Furthermore, our sample size does not
allow us several interesting additional contingency investigations, such as the
specific experiences directors make in their network or specific industry
affiliations of the firms, or other interesting model specifications such as the
inclusion of industry affiliation as matching criterion. Due to the size of our
sample, we unfortunately end up with too small subsamples in these kinds of
analyses. With 112 manager year positions, our sample is rather small. However,
this small number occurs due to the fact that there are not many women in
executive positions in German Prime Standard companies. Although the sample
size is small, we do not have to suspect selection biases since our study is based
on a complete count of the Prime Standard. Extending our study beyond the
Prime Standard is not possible since these General Standard companies are
370 Business Research (2014) 7:351–380
123
subject to different reporting requirements and, therefore, for our study required
data are not available. Additionally, the sample size restricts us in addressing
potential problems of endogeneity and reverse causality empirically. For
instance, we cannot assure the strict exogeneity of our moderator and, thus we
cannot exclude that individuals with a lower taste for discrimination are more
likely to serve on multiple boards, respectively, that board members are able to
gain multiple board seats due to their openness towards diversity. These
limitations concerning endogeneity and reverse causality also have to be kept in
mind when interpreting our results. Formally, our empirical results only indicate
correlations and no causal relations. A larger sample would enable us to
calculate our empirical models using generalized methods of moments (GMM)
(Arellano and Bond 1991) which have been implemented in prior studies (Hillier
et al. 2011; Pathan 2009) since it is amenable to reduce problems of
endogeneity, i.e., a possible correlation between the explanatory variables and
the error term. In summary, we hope that we could encourage researchers to
extend our study concerning these sample size issues whenever Germany
reached the critical mass of female managers to make these kinds of analyses
possible.
We are also not able to incorporate the personalities of the managers. This
would be useful for various reasons. First and often stated, women negotiate
differently than men (Kulik and Olekalns 2012; Bowles et al. 2007; Greig 2008)
and have different preferences for performing in a competition (Niederle and
Vesterlund 2007). It would be interesting to see whether these ideas still hold in
the highest echelons of companies considering that the female managers who are
at that level had to get there in part by negotiation and by facing competition.
Second, the appointment process consists of conversations between directors and
candidates that are both formal and informal. If personalities do not match and
there is a dislike between both sides, the result can be lower pay. Qualifications
might only play a minor role in that part of the negotiation. Data generation is
rather difficult in these areas of research as it is nearly impossible to gather
unbiased questionnaire data on this hierarchical level of large organization or
conduct experiments that are close to reality. However, questionnaires could
generate further insights into the negotiation strategies, expectations and
preferences of both sides—managers that negotiate for their compensation and
directors that finally decide on the pay levels.
Furthermore, beyond a gender pay gap, we suggest to extend research analyzing
possible pay gaps attributed to different minority groups. The level of a pay gap can
be used as indicator for the strength of indirect discrimination. Combinations of
diversity parameters are interesting to be analyzed, because the social identity has
more than one dimension, e.g., gender and race (Ashkanasy et al. 2002). However,
investigations of this kind require a different dataset than Germany, because the
variation in race, religion or ethical background is not large enough to provide
representative conclusions—a US context might be more suitable for this type of
analysis.
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In spite of these limitations, our results can still have some practical
implications: We show that companies can receive valuable insights from
embedded directors. A company with a more embedded board has an advantage
over a company without an embedded board for several reasons: As previous
studies have shown, knowledge and experience are important resources for
directors to fulfill the tasks they are employed to carry out (Ahern and Dittmar
2012; Haunschild and Beckman 1998). We can now extend the benefits of
embeddedness with the potential reduction of discrimination. Our empirical
results allow the presumption that embedded directors base their decisions about
appointments and compensation contracts less on stereotypes. In turn, they offer
suitable candidates more competitive compensation contracts and therewith
increase the firms’ chances of attaining and retaining capable and competent
executives. These benefits are not restrained to management compensation,
however: They are possible on all hierarchical levels. Knowledge and experience
might help to reduce presumptions of language barriers and therewith stereotypes
about minority groups among the majority workers of a company. One
possibility for companies to establish an environment of reduced stereotypes
and equal opportunities is, therefore, the creation of alternative knowledge
sources such as trainings or cross-mentoring programs. Implementing such
trainings to professionalize the board might be beneficial if its members are not
yet embedded in networks. This is also a possible lever for regulators: Pushing
for such trainings to be mandatory could improve the corporate governance of
the country as a whole.
This paper offers a different perspective on explaining unequal compensation of
female and male executives. We propose a closer look at the deciders’ side of
management compensation and the communication barriers between majority and
minority groups. Discrimination by the board has an impact on the gender pay gap.
Embeddedness as a proxy for learning can decrease the extent of the inequality and
can increase the quality of boards.
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Appendix
See Table 5 for an overview of all variables and their definitions and sources.
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Executive summary
Our study examines the differences in the level of compensation between female
and male executives—the so-called gender pay gap—and how it is affected by the
density of the directors’ network that is created when directors serve on multiple
boards. The empirical investigation is based on a matched sample of 112 executive
year observations. Our results are twofold: We find that differences in managerial
compensation between women and men still exist even if we take into account the
possible explanations at the company level (financial, company and corporate
governance characteristics) as well as at the personal level (age, tenure, functional
responsibility). Female managers, thus, earn less than comparable male colleagues.
We attribute our findings to the preferences of directors—the actual deciders on
executive compensation levels—and consider different pay levels as a form of
indirect discrimination. Thus, we question the role of the social network that
directors are embedded in. We find evidence that directors use their network as a
knowledge source to reduce stereotypes which in turn decreases the gender pay gap.
Summarized, more embedded directors decrease the gender pay gap among
executives.
Our findings help companies in various ways: Previous studies have shown that
knowledge and experience are important resources that help directors fulfill their
tasks. We can add the reduction of discrimination to the benefits of embeddedness.
Embedded directors become more knowledgeable and experienced using their
network as learning platform. They base their decisions about appointments and
compensation contracts less on stereotypes and in turn make suitable candidates
more competitive offers. This increases the firms’ chances of attaining and retaining
capable and competent executives. Furthermore, the utilization of these embedd-
edness effects is possible on all hierarchical levels: Gained knowledge and
experience might help reduce stereotypes about minority groups among the majority
workers of a company. This effect could be reinforced by trainings or cross-
mentoring programs within companies.
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